primary sources. Athena's books are heavily annotated; the margins of her copy of Aristotle's Rhetoric, for instance, are filled with her incisive handwritten commentary.
Information about Athena Rhetoric's family is sparse. Athena apparently was happily married. Her husband died long ago, but the Rhetorics' only child, a daughter named Meta, could conceivably still be alive. Meta became a circus performer in the 1930s, moved to the Midwest, and has not been heard from since. No one knows whether Meta Rhetoric is dead or alive or has children or heirs.
As D-studies the papers, she becomes fascinated with her discovery. Athena Rhetoric was a feminist and an influential educator at a small Southern college. Her comprehensive theories anticipated much of contemporary rhetoric. It seems fitting that her name was Athena, after the versatile goddess of wisdom and the state who at the same time celebrated the arts of domesticity and the hearth. D-wants to show what it was like for Athena to be a woman, a teacher, a mother, a wife, a colleague, and a rhetorician in her time. In modern parlance, Athena "had it all."
To make Athena's contributions known, D-plans to write a book that will interpret Athena's writings, showing their significance in both past and present. At the same time, D-will show how Athena lived and worked, making this account vivid through the details she has been carefully recording from Athena's unpublished diaries and letters. D-can show that Athena wore a black hat during the week, but a festive blue on Sunday. Athena would curse the president of her college one day, but bake him a loaf of raisin bread the next. She coined new, and not necessarily proper, words to satirize the popular rhetoric textbooks of her time. She opposed teaching spelling to young children because it would hamper their use of language. "Let words spill from their mouths and pour from their pens," she advised.
For months, then years, D-continues reading, carefully turning yellowed pages that threaten to crumble between her gloved fingers. Some of the libraries she visits allow researchers to make a photocopy or other reproduction of unpublished material. Others interpret copyright law differently and will neither loan copies through interlibrary loan nor permit photocopying of unpublished material without permission of the copyright owner, whose identity in this instance is uncertain. In such cases, D-must copy materials by hand, a laborious process that introduces errors and requires long, expensive stays in distant cities. 3 Over time, D-fills stacks of note cards. She teaches in summer school to earn money so she can afford a few trips. She visits Athena's home town on A key case on this point is Salinger v. Random House, 6 which involved biographer Ian Hamilton's attempt to quote and paraphrase brief selections from unpublished letters written by J. D. Salinger, author of Catcher in the Rye. Salinger, who seemed extremely uninterested in being the subject of a biography, sued for copyright infringement. In 1987, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found that Random House (and Hamilton) had exceeded fair use guidelines under which an author may quote and paraphrase limited amounts of another author's expressive material without permission. 7 The 1985 Supreme Court ruling in Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises 8 first developed the presumption, applied in Salinger, against fair use of virtually any unpublished copyrighted expression. In Harper & Row, The Nation magazine had obtained an unpublished manuscript of a forthcoming book by President Gerald Ford and published a review quoting about 300-400 of Ford's unpublished words prior to another first serial publication already licensed by Ford's publisher, Harper & Row. The subsequent Salinger decision stated that if a writer uses "more than minimal amounts of (unpublished) expressive content, he deserves to be enjoined." 9 It seemed that a subject of a biography who suspected that a forthcoming biography might contain an undefined "more than minimal" amount of the subject's unpublished copyrighted material could seek, and expect to receive, an injunction blocking publication.
At first, it appeared that an injunction might be virtually automatic, but the author of the Salinger opinion, Second Circuit judge Jon 0. Newman, later suggested that injunctions are not automatic, but are discretionary. 1 0 Courts could also consider other factors (such as the public interest) before issuing them. In a later case, New Era Publications International v. Henry Holt, Co., II the Second Circuit permitted Holt to distribute Russell Miller's biography of the late L. Ron Hubbard (founder of Scientology and author of Dianetics 12) because of a technicality.' 3 However, the opinion expressed the view that the biographer's use of even brief quotations and close paraphrases of Hubbard's unpublished works was not a fair use.
D-takes the law very seriously. For years she left tags attached to the pillows in her bedroom because they said "DO NOT REMOVE UNDER PENALTY OF LAW." She has no legal training, however, so she struggles 
873 F2d 576 (2d Cir 1989) ("New Era I").
12. L. Ron Hubbard, Dianetics (Am Saint Hill Org., 1972) (distributed by the Church of Scientology).
13. "The prejudice suffered by Holt as the result of New Era's unreasonable and inexcusable delay in bringing the action invokes the bar of laches." New Era 1, 873 F2d at 584. while attempting to translate the opinions she has read into practical steps to take with her project. One option that comes to mind is to try to avoid the fair use question altogether by getting permission from Athena's daughter, Meta, who may be the copyright owner. D-decides to look for Meta. She searches telephone directories of major cities and runs notices in newspapers but receives no response. Circus records from the 1930s are hard to obtain and, unfortunately, the recent court opinions give D-no guidance on how long or how hard she should look.
D-lies awake nights wondering what will happen if she does locate Meta. It could be wonderful. Meta might be excited by D-'s work; she might offer memories and insights. But D-cannot help imagining less attractive possibilities:
1. Meta may be one of many who think that "rhetoric" is bad, that it is what George Bush accused Saddam Hussein of using. She might not want D-to tell the world that her mother was a rhetorician. 1. She would like to quote excerpts from the unpublished letters by students, faculty, and administrators who wrote to Athena. Where does D-search for them or their heirs to get permission? 2. Who owns the copyright to the notes Athena's students took of her oral lectures? To an essay that appears to have been a collaboration between Athena and several other faculty and students? To an uncredited photograph of Athena that was in her papers?
In light of these questions and possible problems, D-briefly considers abandoning her work. However, she decides that her best course would be to limit her use of unpublished works to fair use, if she can figure out how to do SO.
The copyright laws require that courts consider at least four factors in determining whether a quotation or close paraphrase of another's unpublished work without permission is a fair use.' 4 Courts look to: (1) the purpose of use; (2) the nature of the work used; (3) how much, both in quantity and quality, a work uses an author's "creative expression"; and (4) whether the use will affect the value of the unpublished work. D-studies these factors one by one. On the first factor, D-figures she should be in good shape. Several district and circuit court decisions have found that biographies that contribute to criticism, scholarship, or research generally fit fair use guidelines. 5 However, a look at the other three factors shows a darker shade of gray. In both Salinger and New Era I, the Second Circuit ruled that these three factors went to the advantage of the source, and thus against the biographer. On the second factor, the court's position about use of unpublished works was starkly stated in New Era I: "[w]here use is made of materials of an 'unpublished nature,' the second fair use factor has yet to be applied in favor of an infringer ....,,6 In Salinger, the Second Circuit opinion stated that works that are unpublished "normally enjoy complete protection against copying any protected expression."' 7
In a more recent case, Wright v. Warner Books,' 8 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals continued to take the position that factor two favors the plaintiff when unpublished works are used. In this case, biographer Margaret Walker and her publisher, Warner Books, were sued by Ellen Wright, widow of the late Richard Wright, the author of Native Son and Black Boy. Ellen Wright complained that Walker's biography of Richard Wright had wrongfully made use of some of his published and unpublished works. Both the district and appellate court decisions ultimately favored the biographer/defendant. However, on the second factor itself, regarding the unpublished nature of the copyrighted works, the appellate court disgreed with the district court's view that factor two favored the biographer. Based on previous rulings in Harper & Row, Salinger, and New Era I, the appeals court once again found that factor two favored the plaintiff: "[o]ur precedents.., leave little room for discussion of this factor once it has been determined that the copyrighted work is unpublished."' 19 D-fears that she might also face difficulty on the fourth factor, which has generally been considered the most important. The Supreme Court in Harper & Row and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Salinger and New Era I ruled that the secondary use of the unpublished work would likely decrease its market value for the copyright owner, so this factor weighed against the 14. 17 USC § 107 (1976).
15. "Our cases establish that biographies in general, and critical biographies in particular, fit 'comfortably within' these statutory categories 'of uses illustrative of uses that can be fair.' " New Era the court's current stance, D-worries that if she quotes or closely paraphrases more than a "minimal" amount of Athena's unpublished material, she may be at risk. And so much will be lost in substance and readability if she has to write a biography of Athena that makes such restricted use of primary, unpublished sources. Finally, D-looks at factor three, which may have room for interpretation. Here, the court would consider how much, in terms of both quantity and quality, D-uses of Athena's "creative expression." Although this factor weighed against the biographer in the appeals court rulings in both Salinger and New Era I, it went in favor of the biographer in Wright, which gives Dsome slight hope.
2 '
This third factor raises some key questions. First, can Dclearly distinguish which elements are "ideas" or "facts" (which she may use) from those that are Athena's "expression" (which she usually may not)? For example, D-believes that she can legally report the "fact" that Athena got soaked by the rain on April 28 of a certain year if Athena recorded that event in herjournal. 22 However, the use of Athena's statement that the rhetorics of her time demonstrate "the logic of a crazy quilt" is less clear. That statement is Athena's opinion, but for D-'s purposes, it could also be considered a fact that Athena held that opinion and a fact that Athena said it.23 20. Id at 740. 21. In Wright, Judge John Walker found the biographer's use to be insubstantial, and therefore a fair use, 748 F Supp at 105, and the court of appeals agreed that the biographer's "sparing use" of creative expression was fair use. 953 F2d at 739.
22. Whether that statement of "fact" is accurate or not is another story and is not always easily determined, even about things that seem fairly uncontroversial. For example, witness the confusion about facts concerning Poe, who has been the subject of much scholarship and numerous biographies for more than a century. "Speculations abound," according to a recent compilation that claims to contain what are allegedly "the verifiable facts" about Poe. "One commentator suggests that Poe was impotent while another tries to prove that he impregnated someone else's wife." 23. Although facts are often ambiguous in biography, Mary Sarah Bilder notes that the law seems to operate as if facts objectively exist and as ifjudges can make distinctions between fact and expression. "Intuitive judicial division of fact and expression bars 'fact' as a fluid concept. The presumption that a quotation is 'expression' bars the use of quotation as fact." Mary Sarah Bilder, The Shrinking Back: The Law of Biography, 43 Stan L Rev 299, 349 (1991). This places severe constraints on the biographer's ability to work.
To remedy this situation in part, Bilder proposes that what she terms "fact use" be permitted. "In short, fact use suggests that biographers' quotations of unpublished expression should be classified as 'fair' under the fact/expression part of a copyright analysis and thus permitted." Id at 356. She points to comments in several district court opinions that resemble this rationale, but observes that an appellate court has not yet recognized it. Id.
A similar distinction that the law requires is the separation of a source's ideas (which may be used by a biographer) and the source's expression of those ideas (which generally may not). Understandably, the courts find that this "idea/expression dichotomy" is sometimes difficult to discern. D-'s task is further complicated because she does not always understand how judges arrive at such distinctions. For instance, in Wright, the appellate court deemed the biographer's paraphrases of some journal entries to be "borderline expression." 24 How is D-to know where that border lies? And in Salinger, the court noted that biographer Hamilton erred in copying from a number of Salinger's letters, "including several highly expressive insights about writing and literary criticism." '2 5 What is meant by "highly expressive insights"? "Insights" might be roughly the same as "ideas," which, even if highly original or unique in substance, are supposedly not protected by copyright and thus could presumably be used. But a "highly expressive insight" seems to be something different, something that intermingles expression and idea. Is it something else that D-cannot use? Her book grows slimmer by the minute.
Another issue concerns how much use of Athena's "creative expression" is too much to be deemed fair use. D-discovers that, unfortunately, "[t]he rule of thumb is that there is no rule of thumb." 26 Furthermore, the court considers more than just the amount of use. In Harper & Row, some 300-400 unpublished words of a source were considered an acceptable "minimal" number when used in an article of 2,250 words. 2 7 (Words from the original source made up about 13 percent of the user's article.) However, infringement occurred anyway, the court said, because those 300+ words were the "heart" of the source. 28 In another case, original unpublished material made up only about 1 percent of an author's book, but again infringement occurred because the unpublished letters were "prominently featured" in the work that used them. 29 In Salinger, the Second Circuit examined each of forty-four letters by Salinger to determine how much of each one was quoted or closely paraphrased in Hamilton's biography. 30 After surveying several cases, D-lists some sample questions she might have to answer to determine fair use: 2. D-does not know the total number of words in Athena's entire unpublished corpus, and determining that at this juncture is impossible.
3. D-cannot afford to travel to all the libraries again to count words and identify the "heart" of each document.
.4. Furthermore, D-does not have photocopies of many of the libraries' unpublished material. In fact, there seems to be a Catch-22 at work. Some libraries, unsure about how to follow the vague fair use guidelines for making photocopies, will not provide a researcher with the copies that might enable the researcher to avoid violating those vague fair use guidelines. This need to count words troubles D-. It brings back unwelcome memories of counting the words in her themes for freshman composition. Moreover, she cannot be sure about what is a "safe" number of words to use. D-decides she needs legal advice because even a minor, accidental miscalculation could have a devastating effect. No wonder the 1976 revision of the Copyright Act has been called the "full employment act" for lawyers.3 Now D-must go about locating a good copyright lawyer, which could be an expensive proposition. Perhaps President Ford's publisher could afford to take a dispute over some 300 words all the way to the Supreme Court, but a college professor is not able to do this.
D-finds that the counting and weighing in the case of Athena Rhetoric is not over as she turns from quantity to quality. Courts may consider whether D-'s use is substantial in a qualitative sense-that is, whether D-takes 31. Henry P. Tseng, New Copyright USA 206 (Amco International, 1979).
TELL-TALE "HEART"
Athena's protected material or "expressive content" by relying too closely on Athena's original patterns, or interpretations, or emphasis of points. 3 2 They also look for the "tell-tale heart," which is, D-discovers, not always easy to identify.
In Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises, The Nation magazine took from Gerald Ford, the court said, " 'the heart' of a 'soon-to-be published' work" and, in doing so, caused a first serial publication agreement between Ford's publisher and Time magazine "to be aborted." 3 3 As a consequence, Ford's publisher, Harper Brautigan described a fictional library to which authors take their unpublished works, in which they are perpetually protected and perpetually unread. Authors never see these manuscripts again, nor does anyone else: "Nobody ever checks them out and nobody ever comes here to read them." '3 5 From there they are taken for storage to caves in California by Foster, an adoptive parent. 36 This fictional library serves as a sealed environment transporting manuscripts that never reach readers: it is an "airplane of books, flying through the pages of eternity." 37 Is this to be the fate of Athena's unpublished works? To be shut up in cartons on library shelves?
Not if D-can help it. But she knows she had better figure out just what this "heart" is. The opinions often conclude that the "heart" of a copyrighted work was or was not taken without elaborating on what factors went into that decision. The courts seems to use a "you know it when you see it" test. The Harper & Row Supreme Court opinion quotes an editor who viewed the Ford chapters used by The Nation as "the most interesting and moving parts of the entire manuscript," and the court notes that The Nation wrongfully used "the most powerful passages" of these Ford chapters. 3 8 These seem to constitute the "heart" in this case.
The "heart" might also refer to more than words quoted. Ian Hamilton said, "It wasn't just a matter of not stealing Salinger's exact words. Each of 32. Salinger, 811 F2d at 98. "What is protected is the manner of expression, the author's analysis or interpretation of events, the way he structures his material and marshals facts, his choice of words and the emphasis he gives to particular developments. his letters was, it seemed, a living thing and had a heart that could also be stolen." 39 According to Hamilton's description of the deposition process of the lawsuit, Salinger himself was shown each of his own letters that Hamilton had used and Salinger "was asked to identify its 'expressive heart' and to say how much of this he thought I had stolen. What was the 'main purpose' of each letter? Which was its 'most important' section?" 40 Judging from the court opinions D-has read, she figures that the "heart" of a book may be whatever is most interesting, moving, powerful, important, or significant. The "central portion" is another possible candidate. 4 1 Furthermore, the court may look for the "heart" in two places: in Athena's works and in the book D-is writing. Thou shalt not take thy subject's unpublished, copyrighted heart. And thou shalt not take what is less than thy subject's heart, but make it the heart of thy biography.
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This area is so complicated that even the courts disagree. For example, in Salinger, Judge Pierre Leval of the district court concluded that the passages the biographer used from Salinger's copyrighted material "are not the heart of Salinger's letters, nor of Hamilton's book." 43 However, while not claiming that Salinger's "heart" had been taken, the appellate court disagreed with Leval's overall evaluation of this factor. It felt that Hamilton's quotations and paraphrases of Salinger's unpublished letters were significant in quantity and quality. These letters provided an "important ingredient" for the biography that "to a large extent ... make the book worth reading."
The phrase "make the book worth reading" confuses D-. Worth reading for whom? Is "heart"--or whatever else one calls the qualitative factors, whether of style or substance-something that is an inherent feature of the text? Or could it vary for different readers in different times and places? Should we ask the author, when available, to determine the "heart" of his or her own works, as seems to have been part of the procedure in the Salinger case? Or is that judgment up to a potential buyer such as the editor of Time, as was mentioned in Harper & Row? Or should that decision be left to the biographer? To the specialist reader? To the judge?
Often in copyright matters, the audience is assumed to be the average or ordinary reader. How should we characterize that audience in the case of unpublished works that have existed for some time, such as those of Athena 42. In Wright, the Second Circuit states that " [t] here is some confusion whether factor three also should be examined in relation to the allegedly infringing work." 953 F2d at 738. That is, should the court consider how much (quantitatively and qualitatively) of an allegedly infringing biography is composed of protected passages from the plaintiff's copyrighted works? Not so, the Second Circuit says in Wright: "the language of section 107 does not direct us to examine factor three in relation to the infringing work." Id at 739. Still, the court goes ahead and examines this relationship in Wright anyway, explaining that it does so "because our precedents have applied this gloss to factor three, and because this perspective gives an added dimension to the fair use inquiry .
Id. 43. 650 F Supp 413, 423 (SDNY 1986). 44. Salinger, 811 F2d at 98-99.
TELL-TALE "HEART"
Rhetoric? Is "heart" what the late nineteenth century reader might have judged most powerful, most interesting, or most important? What if that is different now?
Before D-leaves the qualitative issues, she finds one more "organic" metaphor to reckon with. Some of the opinions allow a biographer to quote small amounts of unpublished material if she uses it as evidence for a claim she makes, to buttress her argument about her subject. However,the biographer/historian should not (at least according to certain judges) use it to "enliven" her own text. This term is also left undefined, but it seems to suggest that one should not animate one's biography text with the subject's expression.
In Wright v. Warner Books, D-is relieved to find that the district court judged biographer Margaret Walker's use of Richard Wright's "previously published creative expression" to be lawful. Walker quoted this material to "demonstrate its creativity" and to "provide substance to her literary critique" rather than to "enliven her text."
'4 5 Thus, the biographer had safely refrained from reporting the facts in "a poetic style that might remain beyond her reach, or for that matter the reach of any biographer." 46 The opinion describes Richard Wright's writings favorably as his "creative expression" that is present in his "brilliant novels and autobiographical works"; however, Wright's biographer-or any biographer-is apparently not expected to attain such "poetic style."
Why, D-wonders, should one assume "poetic style" to be out of reach of all biographers? Margaret Walker is a case in point. She is the author not only of the biography of Wright, but also of the novelJubilee and five books of poetry, one of which (For My People) won the Yale Series of Younger Poets Award. It appears that even when a court rules in the biographer's favor, there may still be a lingering suggestion that a biographer's art is inferior to that of his or her subject. 4 s Thus, the biographer must be wary of 45 . 748 F Supp at 109. 46. Id. 47. Id at 112. 48. Diane Conley provides an excellent analysis of "the courts' hierarchical thinking" in recent copyright cases regarding fair use of unpublished material. The courts perceive some authors of fiction and poetry, for example, to be "original geniuses whose works spring, Athena-like, fully formed from their creative brows, and others as scavengers who piece together works by appropriating the creative labors of the more talented." Diane Conley, Author, User, Scholar, Thief: Fair Use and Unpublished Works, 9 Cardozo Arts & Enter LJ 15, 21 (1990) . The creative work done by "scavengers" such as biographers and historians is valued less, Conley notes, and hence is "insufficiently tolerated" by the courts, and that translates into decisions weighing against them. Id at 23.
The issue of who is the original creator and who is the secondary "user" becomes more complex when one looks at the process of composition. For example, according to two of Richard Wright's biographers (one of them Margaret Walker, the defendant in Wright v. Warner Books), parts of Wright's well-known novel, Native Son, apparently drew from an attorney's brief from a Chicago murder trial that was going on while Wright was writing his novel and also from numerous newspaper clippings about the trial that Margaret Walker had sent to Wright. "He said he had enough [clippings] to spread all over his nine-by-twelve bedroom floor," Walker wrote. "He would .. . read them over and over again and then take off from there in his own imagination." Margaret Walker, Richard Wright Daemonic Genius 123 (Warner Books, 1988). See also Michel Fabre, The World "enlivening": taking (illegally) the subject's words to "put life into" the biographer's (otherwise lifeless?) text.
Finally, D-decides to play lawyer and apply the principles about "heart" and "enlivening" and "creative expression" to just one unpublished letter. To Athena Rhetoric, the audience was extremely important: it was not simply something or someone you addressed. The audience (actual or imagined) could stimulate the writer's ideas, affect purposes, and influence tone. She summed it up in three words: "Audience is all." D-wants to quote "Audience is all." It appears in a brief letter of thirty words, so it is just 10 percent of that letter, but this might still be too much. Someone could also argue that this sentence contains the "heart" of Athena's theory of rhetoric. Perhaps it does, but that is why it is worth quoting. D-hopes to use the sentence because it also shows the reader Athena's style. However, she may be accused of stealing Athena's "creative expression" to "enliven" her own prose.
D-is thoroughly upset. There it is: the "heart" of Athena's entire rhetorical enterprise in one sentence of three words, five syllables, thirteen letters. "Villains!" D-shrieks to an imaginary court. "I admit the deed!" 4 9 She begs the court for mercy: "Take thy beak from out my heart, and take thy form from off my door," but this is to no avail; quoth the judges: "Nevermore."-50 So she erases Athena's line and tries to paraphrase "Audience is all":
One of Ms. Rhetoric's key sentences conveys her sense that the role of the audience is an encompassing factor in any rhetorical situation. Moreover, the clipped style of the sentence suggests her conciseness and economy. Her prose passage also gives a hint of her affection for alliteration.
If D-writes this stuff, she may hear Athena rising up in protest from across the bar, her "heart" resounding in the library walls but heard so far only by D-as she murders Athena's prose in the attempt to preserve rights for an unfound heir who may think that rhetoric is something bad that politicians use. Like the "purloined letter" in one of Poe's stories, Athena's letters are simultaneously displayed and hidden. Although they may be placed "full in the view of every visitor,"' ' Furthermore, D-conjectures, even if we cannot know Athena's intention, or even if Athena did not want us to use her works, we still have a valid claim on her as a member of the human community. After all, like the rest of us, Athena created in part by "using": using a language others taught her; using the works of authors living and dead; using the people with whom she talked and worked. When does society get to know the form and substance of Athena Rhetoric? The voice of the public is muffled when the legal debate is framed as the property rights of subject versus biographer, of one author versus another.
Finally D-decides that she is tired of worrying and guessing. She will not go through the ordeal of writing two different versions of her book-one that quotes or closely paraphrases a small amount of unpublished material, and one that does not-and then waiting to see if a publisher will choose to publish one or the other (or neither). 5 3 Even if a publisher is willing to take a risk by including some unpublished material, a lawsuit could result, which would be time-consuming and expensive. Furthermore, D-is facing other pressures. She has to publish something or she may lose a promotion, or even her job. She cannot wait more than a decade until December 31, 2002, when papers such as Athena's may perhaps enter the public domain. 54 D-realizes that the dilemma about unpublished materials affects not only those who write about Gerald Ford, J. D. Salinger, L. Ron Hubbard, Richard Wright, and others of fame and notoriety. It also affects the teacher who hopes to learn (and teach) about the process of writing by comparing unpublished early drafts of writing (whether by students, speech writers, or literary "greats") with later, published versions. It affects the journalist who locates and records certain logs and memoranda that provide crucial "evidence" about a current social controversy, but who may be unable to quote such documents since they might be regarded as unpublished as far as copyright is concerned.
Furthermore, the legal dilemma may discourage work by scholars who attempt to recover the writings of women, of minorities, of so-called "ordinary" or "marginal" people whose works have remained unpublished because they were unfound, unread, unrecognized for their merits, or actively suppressed. It seems ironic and regrettable if, when such works are finally found, the laws that purport to protect them as property keep them hidden instead.
However, D-cannot afford the luxury of regret. It is time to bail out by turning to something else. She will write about theory, which costs just the fare to the library, uses published books, and has fewer legal risks. Later, while patrolling the dull but safe terrain of secondary sources, Dpauses outside the manuscript room. Athena is in there, privately preserved in that time-capsule that is so unlike the local Athenaeum she may have known, the public reading room that Athena would perhaps prefer. Dimagines her reclining on her side on the dusty shelves, her chin propped on one hand, her brown eyes searching the dimly-lit aisles. Athena drums her fingers against the oak, impatient to be put to some good use. She who believed that "Audience is all" now has no audience at all. But D-cannot escape that tell-tale rhythm described by Poe's narrator, that "low, dull, quick sound-much such a sound as a watch makes when enveloped in cotton." 56 Ticking across decades, legally safe and sound, but unavailable for use, the heart of Athena Rhetoric beats on. 
her creative expression embodied in written texts against the first amendment right to free speech, the public's right to know, and society's desire to benefit from and build on what is in those texts.
That balance has been disturbed by the Harper & Row, Salinger, and New Era I rulings, which have emphasized an author's property rights in unpublished works over interests of other authors (such as biographers and historians) and, ultimately, over the interests of the reading public. A chief rationale for this position seems to be that the original authors or their heirs should have the opportunity to publish the works first (or not to publish them at all), and that the commercial value of these unpublished works should not be reduced by others' use of them.
The debate over fair use raised by these cases, especially regarding unpublished works that might otherwise be unavailable to society, has broad significance. "This trend restricting the use of unpublished works must be examined carefully," observed Senator Patrick Leahy, "because it implicates significant competing interests." 5 7 The fair use debate marks zones of current renegotiations: between private and public spheres, between private and communal property, and between a Romantic or Platonic view of the author/originator and a contrasting view of authorship as socially situated. The recent judicial and legislative attempts to alter the delicate balance in these relationships may indicate that prevailing views about authorship and ownership of artistic and intellectual property are changing.
However, such theoretical and philosophical issues, although important, cannot be the only concern of authors and publishers who must make practical decisions about what research can and cannot be done, and what books can and cannot be written and read. Many concerned groups-the Authors Guild, the PEN American Center, the Organization of American Historians, the Modern Language Association, and others-requested the Supreme Court to rehear the Salinger and New Era I cases, but the court refused. Thus, the rulings restricting the use of unpublished materials remain in effect.
These recent opinions have provided little practical guidance for writers, who are apt to feel confusion and fear when they try to apply fair use decisions to their own practices. Those affected include not only the scholars such as the fictitious "D-," but also many others, such as newspaper and magazine writers, historians, biographers, nonfiction writers, literary critics, graduate students, and other researchers.
At publishing houses, manuscripts are being revised, with difficulty and not without cost, to eliminate quotation from unpublished sources. Helen Stephenson, executive director of the Authors Guild, the major professional organization representing the interests of more than six thousand authors, emphasized the impact of the recent cases on books: "At the major publishing houses, there is zero quotation from unpublished work; it's considered too risky by publishers' attorneys." 5 8
For example, excerpts from unpublished letters that John Connally had written to Lyndon Johnson (kept in the L. B. J. library) were reportedly removed from James Reston's biography of Connally. 59 To Reston, finding the letters had seemed a "research coup," but they turned out to be too risky to use. "Good research was a form of entrapment," Reston concluded in a letter to Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. 60 Schlesinger himself was dissatisfied by the recent court rulings. "If the law were this way when I wrote the three volumes of The Age of Roosevelt," he said, "I might be two volumes short." 6 ' Writing in The Wall Street Journal, Schlesinger argued that the New Era I decision "strikes a blow against the whole historical enterprise." 6 2
The restrictions placed on direct quotations have affected authors' abilities to use original research to make a vivid point. While researching his book on school desegregation, On Common Ground, J. Anthony Lukas had traveled through Georgia swamps to uncover a Boston family's roots in slavery. In an attic, he discovered a slave owner's letter about a gift for his nephew. The slave owner wrote, "I am sorry that circumstances are such that I cannot give him a Negro, but I must do the next best thing left, that is give him a mule." 6 3 A mere paraphrase of the facts might have diminished the impact of this statement, but after New Era I, Lukas observed, he might have had to leave that telling line out. 64 Quotation of language from primary sources provides readers with direct "evidence" that allows them to see the basis for a biographer's or historian ' vocabulary. I think we have to at least address the language, which is itself setting up land mines and revelations. ' 
The controversy over fair use of unpublished works is being debated in political, professional, and legal arenas. Following an outcry from historians, biographers, journalists, book and magazine publishers, and others, legislation was introduced in Congress in 1990. The bills introduced by Representative Robert Kastenmeier and Senator Paul Simon proposed to amend copyright law to clarify that fair use extends to unpublished as well as published works. 6 7 According to Representative Kastenmeier, the legislation aimed "to clarify that, while the unpublished nature of a work is certainly relevant to the fair use analysis, it should not alone be determinative." 68 The bills received a show of support, including supportive Congressional testimony from some of the judges involved in the recent decisions about fair use of unpublished works, such as district court judge Pierre Leval and the chiefjudge of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, James L. Oakes. 69 However, the legislation died in committee. Apparently representatives of the computer software industry had objected to the new law, fearing that it might reduce the protection for unpublished computer source code. A Wall Street Journal article described the dilemma: "A 'snippet' may be 'fair use' of unpublished material to an author, but a snippet taken from an unpublished software program under fair-use doctrine could be enough to 'decompile' the entire program." 70 Bruce Lehman, counsel for the Software Publishers Association, said, "They are talking about our crown jewels." In early 1991, the Authors Guild established a Committee to Preserve Fair Use to work to eliminate the presumption against using unpublished material. According to Committee ChairJ. Anthony Lukas, the presumption "threatens truly independent biography." ' 69. Id (statements of Pierre N. Leval, U.S. District Judge, Southern District of New York, and James L. Oakes, ChiefJudge, U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit). However, for various reasons, these bills were not supported by the testimony of another judge at these hearings, Circuit Judge RogerJ. Miner of the Second Circuit. Judge Miner suggested instead that fair use should apply to "published and publicly disseminated materials," with "publicly disseminated" meaning "any letters sent without a requirement of confidentiality and any documents, including letters, that have been in existence for a certain period of years without having been copyrighted." Id at 3-4 (statement of Roger J. Miner, Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit). Meanwhile, in the courts, two recent decisions in the Second Circuit have favored the user of unpublished material. A 1991 district court decision applied the four-factor analysis to a charge by the Arica Institute that psychology professor Helen Palmer unlawfully used material that was largely unpublished. 77 Although the second factor (nature of the use) weighed against the defendant, the other three factors weighed in her favor, and Palmer's use was judged to be a fair use. 78 73. In the 102d Congress, Senator Simon, with Senator Leahy, proposed the following addition to section 107 of the Copyright Act, concerning fair use: "The fact that a work is unpublished is an important element which tends to weigh against a finding of fair use, but shall not diminish the importance traditionally accorded to any other consideration under this section, and shall not bar a finding of fair use if such a finding is made upon full consideration of all of the above factors." S 1035, 102d Cong, 1st Sess (May 9, 1991). The previous bill had simply stated that both published and unpublished works could be eligible for fair use.
74. Perhaps because the wording of this new version was arrived at through compromise among the interested parties (including representatives of authors, publishers, and the computer software industry) before it was introduced, there was apparently little controversy in the Senate. 78. Id at 1058. Less encouraging, however, was the appellate court's overall view of factor two, which disagreed with the district court's analysis and continued to emphasize protection of unpublished materials: "unpublished works are the favorite sons of factor two." 8 0 The unpublished material that Walker used in her biography was in this case permitted, but a key reason for permitting it was that the amount was very small-only "seven protected segments" 8 '
(closely paraphrased or quoted), which the court of appeals described as ''marginal amounts" and "sparing use," and which made up only "a slight fraction of the biography-at most, two pages of a 428-page book. 
Help researchers and writers to understand the status quo and to reduce some of the risk and cost.
Major works of biography and history can be enormously expensive and time-consuming, even without the threat of legal difficulty. The added burdens of huge legal expenses and years spent fending off lawsuits can affect what is and is not written. Without help, writers may opt for projects that seem less confusing, less costly, and less risky. Controversial projects that could produce important knowledge might be ignored or abandoned. Furthermore, books may be written cautiously, leaving out potentially risky material, which ultimately undermines the advancement of knowledge.
To help writers with such difficulties during a transitional time, perhaps some copyright lawyers would be willing to provide pro bono assistance, as Second Circuit Judge Jon Newman has suggested. 8 5 Publishers could offer greater protection to an author by increasing the insurance coverage they extend to authors and by substantially lowering authors' deductibles.
Also, continuing education for authors could be helpful. Professional organizations might assist their members in understanding copyright by providing instructional workshops, symposia, publications, and access to inexpensive legal advice. This guidance is especially important in early stages of research and drafting, before authors have a contract with a publisher.
Librarians and curators could increase efforts to collect and supply information on matters such as names and addresses of likely copyright holders. They might also expand the practice some repositories have of asking donors to transfer copyrights to the institution or the public domain. 86 While theJ. D. Salingers of this world may not agree to this, others will. In so doing, they may stimulate future research in their papers, a result that is desirable to donors who hope to have their papers, or those of their ancestors, put to use.
On the other hand, if a copyright holder has strong feelings about terms or conditions for quotations from papers, librarians and curators might try to clarify such terms and make them known to researchers who consult the papers. Having accessible information about the status of unpublished material, says Peter Kurth, author of Anastasia: The Riddle of Anna Anderson and American Cassandra: The Life of Dorothy Thompson, might "at least eliminate the surprise factor" in that an author could find out if the conditions are likely to be acceptable or not before getting deeply involved in a project. 
Urge publishers to take chances.
Judge Jon Newman has advocated that publishers occasionally "take a strong stand in defense of a biographer's proposed use of quotations from an unpublished writing to convey factual material fairly and accurately, and accept the costs of litigation, and even the risk of an unfavorable outcome." ' 8 8 If publishers will take such risks, then legal claims, and the fear of them, might diminish, since those whose unpublished works are used in modest amounts might decide a lawsuit is not worth pursuing. In the event that a lawsuit is filed, academic and professional organizations can support the defendants (authors and their publishers) by continuing the practice of filing "friend of the court" briefs. Publishers can also increase preventive measures. For instance, they can offer legal advice to authors under contract early in the process of research and writing, rather than waiting to read a full manuscript. Authors' methods of research, documentation, and record-keeping are important in these matters, and errors and omissions in research cannot always be corrected in the end.
Request guidance from the courts.
As a non-lawyer, I admittedly arrive at this point with a disadvantage. However, as a concerned writer who has studied a number of court opinions on this matter, I feel that the courts' illustrations of how to apply relevant principles to practice in these cases are not always enlightening. For example, it is difficult to understand how the courts determine when a paraphrase is acceptable and when it is too close to the original. Also, decisions about whether a biographer has used the "heart" of another's work do not always provide a full explanation of reasons. 90 Increasing this uncertainty is the fact that courts have not given clear signals about how they will continue to treat fair use of unpublished materials, as evidenced by a number of recent reversals. 90. Although the involved parties, lawyers, and other judges make up the principal audience for court opinions, they are not the only audience. Even legal scholars and publishers' attorneys have expressed uncertainty about how to interpret the Copyright Act and these copyright rulings.
I doubt that most people in the humanities expect or want the quantifiable certitude of, say, the late attorney Moses Malevinsky's Algebraic Formula for infringement in plays whereby an emotion (A) personified in a character (B) with certain motivations (C) could be expressed as a formulaic relationship: A + B + C in two similar plays establishes infringement, "with the certainty of an engineer's T .... ." Moses Malevinsky, The Science of Playwriting (Brentano's, 1925), described in Lindey, Plagiarism and Originality at 125 (cited in note 1). But writers and publishers and their attorneys could benefit from additional guidance and examples regarding the use of unpublished material.
91. There are a number of examples of reversals and differing interpretations. In Harper & Row, for instance, the district court's decision favoring the plaintiff was reversed by a divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which was in turn reversed by the Supreme Court (ruling the four section 107 factors for judging fair use are "protean," and that "[w]hen combined with the emphasis on case-by-case adjudications in this area, the factors . . . tend to degenerate into post-hoc rationales for antecedent conclusions, rather than serving as tools for analysis." 9 2
Pierre Leval, the district court judge whose Salinger and New Era I rulings were reversed by the appeals court, has been sympathetic to the confusion felt by writers and publishers. He asserts that "[j]udges do not share a consensus on the meaning of fair use" and notes that the 1976 Copyright Act gave the courts little help on some points. 93 For instance, it gave "no guidance for distinguishing between acceptable and excessive levels" 9 4 of copyrighted materials taken by a secondary user (such as a biographer). At the same time, Leval warns that adopting "a definite standard" on the various complex issues involved in fair use determinations could "stifle intellectual activity." 95 Continued exploration of some of the muddy distinctions that operate in fair use cases might prove helpful. Some of these dichotomies, despite the fact that they have existed for some time, may in fact prove unworkable. For example, how readily can these supposed opposites be distinguished: Fact from expression? Idea from expression? Fact or idea from "borderline" expression? Words that substantiate an assertion from words that "enliven" a text? Works that are "original" from those that are "derivative"? Beyond these issues is a fundamental question: Is copyright now viewed primarily as a way to protect private property for an autonomous, "original" author or primarily as a way to stimulate intellectual activity and contribute to the public good?96
There may be hope for a change in the legal climate. If change should indeed occur, both in the theory of literary creativity that informs the court, and in the law itself, it may in fact happen, as Judge Richard Posner has noted, "in a defense of fair use." '9 7 The district and circuit courts have issued various, and sometimes contradictory, reactions to cases regarding fair use of for the plaintiff). In Salinger, the district court's decision in favor of the biographer was reversed by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. In New Era I, the district court's refusal to enjoin publication of a biography was affirmed by the court of appeals, but only because the plaintiff had waited too long to request an injunction. In Wright, the district court's decision for the biographer was affirmed by the court of appeals; at the same time, however, the appeals court disagreed with the district court's analysis of the second fair use factor (relating to the unpublished nature of the works used), which the appeals court said should favor the plaintiff rather than the defendant in this case.
92 . Lloyd Weinreb notes different underlying views of copyright in Salinger and New Era I in the decision of Judge Leval and the decision of the Second Circuit. Leval, he feels, views copyright as "conditional on and subservient to the public good" which would have been served by the biographers' uses of unpublished works in these two cases. In contrast, the court of appeals viewed copyright as private property to be controlled by its owner "subject to exceptional and quite limited 
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unpublished works. Some judges have taken the time and trouble to write articles about the dilemma and to testify before Congress about proposed legislation. All this discussion may make the judiciary increasingly aware of the practical consequences of the recent decisions, which may in turn lead to a revised position by the courts in the future. Ralph Oman, Register of Copyrights for the U.S. Copyright Office, has noted that " [t] here is considerable evidence that the Second Circuit has moved away from some of the language in Salinger and New Era that initially caused alarm." 9 8 He adds, however, that "the Copyright Office believes that the concerns of authors and publishers over that language is well-placed, if only because of the lack of predictability in the law." 99
Lobby Congress for legislative change clarifying the status of unpublished material and clarifying (and possibly relaxing) fair use guidelines.
As discussed previously, the process of amending the law began in 1990 with the introduction of bills concerning unpublished material, and it has continued on into 1992. If such legislation is not enacted, or if the courts do not ease the current restrictions on fair use of unpublished works, the prospects for biography and history are troubling.
During this transitional time, there are still questions about the proposed legislative changes. Is legislation needed at this time? Or would it tend to codify matters that should evolve through case law? Does proposed legislation simply clarify the law, or does it alter it? Is it clear enough and strong enough to help authors and publishers? I0 0 Despite such questions, a number of people who have been closely involved with this issue for a long time feel optimistic that the difficulties of biographers and historians would be eased with passage of appropriate legislation.' 0 ' In introducing the 1991 bill, Senator Paul Simon said that this legislation would clarify the matter "that the unpublished nature of a work should not create a virtual per se bar to its use."' 1 2 Unpublished works, he said, would receive the complete analysis currently used for all copyrighted works. This bill was intended to "restore the appropriate balance between 5 Although the recent Wright decision went in the right direction for those favoring fair use of unpublished materials, it did not accomplish all that was desired. Legal experts consulted by the Authors Guild reportedly felt that "the Wright case was the one 'factperfect' case that they could hope to win even if a virtual per se rule against the fair use of unpublished material were to prevail."' 0 6 Given the facts of that case and the very small amount of unpublished material used, the ruling has not alleviated all concerns nor halted the move to amend the law.
If and when new legislation passes, speculation about its effects will continue for some time until more cases are decided by the courts. If this legislation clearly legitimizes some use of unpublished works, then even if it is not perfect, it will certainly be an encouraging step, especially if the courts consider not only the letter of the law but also the legislative history and intent. Furthermore, the process of legislative review has been helping to heighten the awareness of many people about what is at stake and why it matters.
In the future, more should be done in Congress to clarify (and perhaps loosen) fair use guidelines on issues concerning the quantity and type of material used, as well as the purpose of the use. Such matters have not, however, been taken up in the recently proposed legislation. As Register of Copyrights Ralph Oman has noted, the bills proposed in 1991 did not provide "guidelines that will help decide whether a particular use of unpublished material is a fair use."' 1 0 7 Admittedly, it is not easy to clarify such matters without destroying the flexibility that the fair use provisions supposedly offer. Asking for Congressional assistance is not to suggest that the current fair use problems are due entirely to Congress's actions in creating the 1976 Copyright Act. In fact, as Jessica Litman has pointed out, Congress devoted twenty-one years to the development of the Copyright Act, and that process involved much study, debate, compromise, and "congressional midwifery," in which legislators and their staffs attempted to help authors, publishers, and other interested parties to negotiate much of the language.1 0 8 Ambiguity in some fair use provisions may have been intentional, Litman explains, because the parties did not actually resolve their differences-as in, for instance, the ambiguous compromise language arrived at between educational institutions and copyright owners' representatives over fair use in educational photocopying. 0 9 Although resolving some of the ambiguities about fair use may be difficult, hopefully the passage of more than fifteen years since the 1976 Act, together with the careful analysis of relevant litigation during that period, will help in providing perspective. However, the passage of time raises another relevant issue. Some of the difficulties over fair use have been complicated by new technologies that have evolved and continue to change. In the future, Congress must address the question of whether existing copyright law can realistically continue to be used to govern not only its traditional sphere, but also the rapidly changing world of computers and digital media.
This issue has been evident in the debate over fair use of unpublished works. The computer industry did not cause the Salinger and New Era controversies, but it has clearly influenced the ensuing legislative attempts to draft laws that could meet the needs of authors and publishers without causing intellectual property problems for the computer software industry. Recent commentators have emphasized the need for continuing explorations of ways in which the legislative and judicial systems can deal with the diverse and changing needs brought by new technologies. I 0 IV CONCLUSION Finally, I have a more ambitious recommendation: we can reconsider the views of authorship and ownership of texts that affect research and scholarship, our legal system, and our society.
The metaphors we use often tell us something about our assumptions, and, indeed, metaphors influence our thinking in subtle ways of which we are often unaware. In this sense, the "heart" in American copyright law tells a tale about how our society regards invention and creativity. It seems natural, and harmless enough, to see organic metaphors appearing in court opinions that deal with the generation of something new. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor states in Harper & Row that copyright law is intended to increase the "harvest of knowledge" by "fostering the original works that provide the seed and substance of this harvest.""' Continuing in this organic vein, we have seen that the author develops a "corpus": a physical body of texts, each of which has a "heart." In fact, texts may have other body parts as well. In the 1989 district court decision in Love v. Kwitney, the court determined that an author's quotations from an unpublished paper exceeded fair use, reasoning that " [i] f what the Supreme Court refused to permit in Harper & Row was a taking of 'essentially the heart of the book,' . . the taking here involves nearly every vital organ of the paper."
' "1 2
Such personification of the creative process and of texts traces back for centuries, but it was particularly evident during the Romantic period, which emphasized the closeness of the author or artist to nature. For example, Wordsworth's Preface to Lyrical Ballads uses a circulatory metaphor to personify poetry and prose alike: "the same human blood circulates through the veins of both." i In current U.S. law, the life of the body of work (with its "heart") survives the termination of its author and is thereafter protected or controlled by heirs through copyright.
Contemporary use of organic metaphors to describe the writer, the writing process, and the written text underscores the continuing prevalence in America of a view of authorship that goes by various names, among them Platonic, Romantic, and expressionistic." 4 These views share a basic conception of the writer as an atomistic, solitary unit inspired from within. Writing is seen as a private activity carried out through introspection, directed by an innate mechanism. The writer functions in a closed system (a garret, a library carrel, a cabin in a writer's colony) without necessarily interacting with others or with the environment.
Similarly, the blood of the author's "heart" circulates within its enclosed system. (This view contrasts with the medieval Christian concept of the "bleeding heart," which, Lewis Hyde notes, is not confined within individual bodies but is "lifted to a greater circulation."' 15) The atomistic writer "expresses" (presses out what is inside) a text containing an inviolable and unique entity, which, according to capitalist practice, is owned by the author and may be sold.
There has been much criticism of this atomistic concept of the writing self-too much to explore here except in passing. To sum up, it fails to take into account the social origins, influences, and consequences of invention. It abstracts writers from society, deemphasizing or ignoring their constant interactions with socially created language, forms, and norms. It overlooks the fact that social and cultural features are embedded in each individual, and that many ideas, images, and texts derive from the heritage created by others, living and dead. Furthermore, it neglects the power of social collectives that may shape, encourage, or inhibit an individual's invention and creative expression. "1 6 Despite its shortcomings, this atomistic view continues to exert force in America, perhaps because it is fused with (and reinforced by) capitalism, individualism, and patriarchal assumptions. Not surprisingly, the Romantic view of authorship and originality has extended to the legal arena. American law enforces the concept of the autonomous author, determining what a writer owns and what material a writer may use for invention in texts. What Gregory Bateson criticized as the concept of an isolated self "bounded by skin""t 7 has become, after an author's death, a self that lives on in written pages-no longer bounded by skin, but by court subpoena instead.
We have seen that organic metaphors associated with the Romantic view of authorship are present in judicial opinions about copyright law, which discuss, for instance, taking the "heart" or "vital organ" or "vividness" of an author's text and using it to "enliven" the text of another. Do these metaphors help or hurt our understanding of the issues? Why is metaphor centrally employed in such opinions? For example, courts use the "heart" metaphor instead of stating more explicitly the criteria one might use, such as that which is the most representative, interesting, original, revealing, or significant part of the "original" author's expression. No doubt judges choose metaphor because its inexactness allows them a welcome latitude and flexibility. However, this strength of metaphor is also its weakness, since flexibility can translate into confusion when others try to extract general principles from a particular case.
Perhaps personification of the text to this extent is clouding our perceptions. The organic metaphors in legal analysis may unhelpfully direct attention to what an originator has rather than to what an audience gets. Despite what the opinions say explicitly, perhaps courts are in effect not really protecting the "heart" or "expressive content" that one supposedly possesses, but rather, one's ability to disseminate or sell that substance to a potential audience.
Furthermore, such personification of text may elevate an inanimate object to a position of undue importance. The heart metaphor may focus attention on the isolated, enclosed object (bound between covers, with its own "heart" and circulatory system) rather than on the larger social context of which it is a part. "For books continue each other," Virginia Woolf has told us, "in spite of our habit of judging them separately." ' "1 8 In a recent book, Martha Minow observes that legal studies may find useful "intellectual challenges" in the scholarly work from many fields that has "explored the significance of relationships and challenged modes of thought that rest upon autonomous and discrete items or persons."'1 9
Using an organic metaphor-"seed" or "harvest" or "heart"--may even misrepresent the process of creating something new. According to Silvano Arieti's analysis in Creativity: The Magic Synthesis, creativity involves a partnership and interaction between individuals, society, and culture. 120 An individual's creative expression is not comparable, for Arieti, to an acorn's growth. Whereas an acorn, given proper conditions, must become an oak and nothing else, the outcome is much less certain for the development of the creative individual. Use of a seed's growth as a metaphor for creativity may imply misleadingly that creativity develops inevitably through the extension of an individual's innate potential. It may suggest that creativity is something one has (or does not have) rather than what one does as a being that is inevitably social as well as individual.
Given these and other questions, further study of metaphors in judicial copyright opinions could contribute to resolving some current difficulties. Given their economy and flexibility, their beauty and connotative power, metaphors are often of extraordinary value to thinking and writing. We cannot do without them. At the same time, one can question whether a central metaphor in a text or in a field of discourse becomes used so automatically that its appropriateness goes unexamined. It is possible, as poet T. R. Hummer points out, that a given metaphorical proposition that had its beginning as "a hypothetical as if has taken on the form of a statement of fact. And then," Hummer continues, "the entire proposition may find a home in a single word that is powerfully charged with unconscious assumptions "121 Once such a metaphor is identified, one wonders what to do about it. It can be instructive simply to acknowledge metaphor (such as the cluster of organic metaphors in copyright), observing its .truths and its untruths. A metaphor that is judged to be misleading might at times be counteracted, Hummer observes, by "hardheaded literal-mindedness"; but since this, too, has its dangers, he notes another alternative: "At least half the time, the only cure for a bad metaphor is a better one. "' 22 In the area of copyright, analyzing central metaphors (and, if necessary, searching for alternatives) can help to clarify or question underlying assumptions about authorship, originality, and intellectual property. Prevailing views of these concepts now appear to be in flux, and the laws governing them may need to change. However, we should not place all blame and responsibility for solutions on the law. The legal system is certainly not the only system that ought to be dealing with these issues. Still, it is scarcely surprising that disputes over texts and intellectual property are left to the courts, which increasingly bear the weight of so many of the difficult decisions in American society. Thus, a multifaceted issue such as fair use of unpublished texts unfortunately becomes decided almost exclusively by rules of law that emphasize economic principles of Western capitalism.
The value that copyright protects in the market economy does not come without cost to a community. When a society becomes fragmented, there is an imbalance between the individual and the social collective, between separate and corresponding lives. In America there now appears to be an overemphasis on the individual's ownership of a commodity and a decrease in the benefits of the exchange of gifts (such as ideas, texts, forms) in the wider community. In such a case, as Lewis Hyde notes in his analysis of art as gift, people are unable to receive, contribute toward, and pass along the collective treasures we refer to as culture and tradition."' 2 8
As one who has for some time studied rhetorical invention-viewed in part as the generation of ideas, information, propositions, arguments, lines of reasoning, and structures that form the subject matter of discourse-I cannot help but be concerned by certain developments in intellectual property law of which I have been made aware in recent years. Jane Gaines has noted "a tendency in American intellectual property to expand and stretch, to enlarge the domain of protectable culture and to extend the duration of the monopoly grant to owners."' 2 4 Concerning copyright in particular, the authors of Copyright Law note that since the inception of Anglo-American copyright, "protection has been afforded to a progressively larger variety of works, for longer periods of time, against a wider range of unauthorized uses."' 2 5 Many texts and patterns, voices and images therefore are protected by law and do not circulate as potential sources for others' invention. I worry that this trend-as seen, for example, in the recent restrictions on the use of unpublished writings-will, if taken to extremes, significantly constrain creativity, rather than provide the stimulus generally expected to result from the monoply that the law grants to creators.' 26 Those who build on what has come before them (and who does not?) and on what is around them (at least some of which is arguably part of "their" culture) become preoccupied with self-censorship, wary of what they may or may not say, who owns what, who might be watching. Such a climate is inimical to invention, which thrives on experimentation with ideas, materials, forms, traditions, texts, and many other resources.
It may seem naive or idealistic to raise broad questions about invention, authorship, and ownership of intellectual property, concepts that seem so deeply entrenched. Yet these concepts have changed drastically in the past, and there is no reason why they cannot change again. One hundred years ago, an editorial in the London journal of the Society of Authors complained that "those who talk of literary property as if it was a real thing, like turnips, are regarded as madmen."' 2 7 In the 1990s, text has indeed become this "real thing, like turnips," and those who wish to reconsider the nature of the author and the text should not mind similar accusations.
The courts should rehear the case of the autonomous author. Indeed, "discovery" has been proceeding for some time in a number of fields of study. Evidence can be introduced from various cultures and from theorists, past and present, who offer alternative ways to think about invention, authorship, and intellectual property. Among these are Africans, Native Americans, Marxists, poststructural and reader-oriented theorists, social constructionists, anthropologists, and feminists-to name but a few.
A book of poetry entitled Selves by Philip Booth includes "Words Made From Letters," which describes the knowledge that the poem's narrator-the individual "self"-has gained through extended correspondence with others. The narrator holds a letter received from an absent author and says: "I hear you/as I read you, fingertip to fingertip against/the same gray page."' 2 8 I am left to ask: How can writers, selves with lives that are both separate and corresponding, converse more easily across that page? 
